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 LAW SUMMARY 
The Path to Antitrust Success Against the 
NCAA Is More Limited Than You Think 
KEITH STARR* 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
The National Collegiate Athletic Association (“NCAA”) has recently 
run into a bit of an antitrust problem.  Although the NCAA has been chal-
lenged by parties claiming antitrust injury in the past, it has never before seen 
the onslaught of antitrust attacks currently pending against it.  Further com-
plicating the matter is that applying the federal antitrust laws to the NCAA’s 
more restrictive rules and regulations is judicially-uncharted territory.  In Part 
II, this Law Summary provides a brief background on the federal antitrust 
laws and how they have previously applied to the NCAA.  In Part III, this 
Summary discusses some of the more important antitrust challenges currently 
pending against the NCAA.  Lastly, in Part IV, this Summary recommends at 
least one potential change that the NCAA can undertake to address some of 
the antitrust issues caused by the restrictive nature of its rules and regulations. 
II.  LEGAL BACKGROUND 
The law of antitrust is founded in the statutory language of the United 
States Code, but the law as applied is mostly judge-made common law.1  This 
is because the law is simply written and broadly applicable.  The letter of the 
law contains a number of absolutisms which, if read literally, would produce 
an absurd result.2  Over time, judges have read the common law of restraints 
into the antitrust statutes.3  Accordingly, courts have tended to apply the law 
 
* B.A. Psychology & Physical Education, Benedictine College (KS), Class of 2009; 
M.B.A., University of Missouri at Kansas City, Class of 2012; J.D. Candidate, Uni-
versity of Missouri at Columbia School of Law, Class of 2015.  Thanks to Professor 
Thomas A. Lambert for piquing my interest in antitrust.  Thanks to Professor Randy 
Diamond for his assistance with this Summary.  And thanks most of all to Robert 
Griem for his guidance and mentorship. 
 1. See Andrew S. Oldham, Sherman’s March (in)to the Sea, 74 TENN. L. REV. 
319, 328-29 (2007). 
 2. See Thomas A. Lambert, The Roberts Court and the Limits of Antitrust, 52 
B.C. L. REV. 871, 875 (2011) (“Read literally, [S]ection 1 [of the Sherman Act] is so 
broad as to be nonsensical, for every executory contract restrains trade . . . .”). 
 3. Associated Gen. Contractors of Cal., Inc. v. Cal. State Council of Carpenters, 
459 U.S. 519, 530-32 (1983); see also Einer Elhauge, Harvard, Not Chicago: Which 
1
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in a way that would be economically reasonable, producing a result that 
would promote competition between individual economic entities.4 
This Summary focuses specifically on how the Sherman Antitrust Act5 – 
the bedrock of federal antitrust law in the United States – has been used to 
challenge the NCAA’s governance of non-professional athletes and how the 
Sherman Act may be used against the NCAA in the immediate future.6  How-
ever, as a preliminary matter, this Summary walks through a quick history of 
the Sherman Act in order to lay the foundation for the law’s application to the 
NCAA. 
A.  The Sherman Antitrust Act 
The Sherman Act, enacted in 1890, was designed to protect and promote 
economic competition.7  The law is founded on the basic economic concept 
of supply and demand.8  The law assumes that an increase in economic com-
petition will create market efficiencies and benefit consumers by protecting 
them from the evils of diminished competition.9 
Initially, the law’s true purpose was overshadowed by the Supreme 
Court’s strict adherence to the letter of the law.10  This should not have been 
unexpected, as the law clearly states, “Every contract . . . in restraint of trade 
or commerce . . . is declared to be illegal.”11  Thus, the Court, at first, simply 
read and applied what the law literally said.12  For example, in United States 
v. Trans-Missouri Freight Association, the Court read the Sherman Act as 
“prohibit[ing] all agreements and combinations in restraint of trade . . . re-
gardless of . . . whether such agreements were reasonable or the reverse.”13  
Essentially, for a brief time after its enactment, the Sherman Act was read to 
 
Antitrust School Drives Recent U.S. Supreme Court Decisions?, 3 COMPETITION 
POL’Y INT’L 59, 61-62 (Autumn 2007). 
 4. See Bd. of Trade of Chicago v. United States, 246 U.S. 231, 238 (1918). 
 5. Sherman Antitrust Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (2012). 
 6. See generally Drew N. Goodwin, Note, Not Quite Filling the Gap: Why the 
Miscellaneous Expense Allowance Leaves the NCAA Vulnerable to Antitrust Litiga-
tion, 54 B.C. L. REV. 1277, 1280, 1287 (2013). 
 7. See Copperweld Corp. v. Independence Tube Corp., 467 U.S. 752, 788 
(1984). 
 8. See generally Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 319-21 
(1962). 
 9. See Associated Gen. Contractors of Cal., Inc. v. Cal. State Council of Car-
penters, 459 U.S. 519, 538 (1983). 
 10. See generally United States v. Trans-Mo. Freight Ass’n, 166 U.S. 290 
(1897). 
 11. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2012) (emphasis added). 
 12. See Trans-Mo. Freight Ass’n, 166 U.S. at 335. 
 13. Id. 
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prohibit almost every contract that restrained interstate trade.14  However, 
everything changed in 1898 when William Howard Taft, then federal circuit 
judge, decided United States v. Addyston Pipe & Steel Company.15 
B.  The Journey to Reasonable Restraints 
In Addyston Pipe, Taft and the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit in-
corporated the common law of restraints to determine that the Sherman Act 
should only prohibit agreements whose main purpose was to restrain compe-
tition.16  In other words, if the restraint was merely ancillary to some other 
reasonably beneficial and procompetitive purpose it should be upheld.17  
However, if the “sole object . . . in making the contract . . . [was] merely to 
restrain competition, and enhance or maintain prices,” then it should be pro-
hibited.18  Addyston Pipe, later affirmed by the Supreme Court, was instru-
mental in establishing the modern doctrinal foundations of federal antitrust 
law: (1) the per se violation and (2) the rule of reason inquiry.19 
Generally, conduct that amounts to a “naked” restraint of trade is 
deemed to be per se illegal.20  A “naked” restraint is a restraint that serves no 
justifiable business purpose other than the depression of competition.21  
Courts will not inquire into the reasonableness of a “naked” restraint because 
often there is no need to inquire: the type of restraint at issue is often blatantly 
anticompetitive.22 
On the other hand, a rule of reason inquiry is made when a restraint is 
ancillary to a larger agreement and can arguably serve an alternative procom-
petitive motive.23  For example, courts will inquire into the reasonableness of 
a restraint that may create a new product24 or lower transaction costs.25  How-
ever, applying the rule of reason is judicially taxing: the reasonableness of a 
trade restraint can only be determined by analyzing the restraint’s economic 
 
 14. The Sherman Act was applied in this manner for almost a decade after its 
enactment.  See id.; see also Robert H. Bork, The Rule of Reason and the Per Se Con-
cept: Price Fixing and Market Division, 74 YALE. L. J. 775, 785-88 (1965). 
 15. United States v. Addyston Pipe & Steel Co., 85 F. 271 (6th Cir. 1898), aff’d 
as modified, 175 U.S. 211 (1899). 
 16. Id. at 282. 
 17. Id. 
 18. Id. at 282-83. 
 19. See Herbert Hovenkamp, The Sherman Act and the Classical Theory of 
Competition, 74 IOWA L. REV. 1019, 1041-44 (1989); see also Bork, supra note 14, at 
796-801. 
 20. See United States v. Topco Assocs., Inc., 405 U.S. 596, 607-08 (1972). 
 21. Id. 
 22. Id. at 607-10 (quoting N. Pac. R. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5 (1958)). 
 23. Id. at 606-07. 
 24. See Broad. Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc., 441 U.S. 1, 23-24 
(1979). 
 25. See Bd. of Trade of Chicago v. United States, 246 U.S. 231, 240-41 (1918). 
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impact in the relevant market.  In other words, courts must look to a number 
of technical and often theoretical economic factors in order to determine if an 
agreement is procompetitive (and legal) or anticompetitive (and illegal).26 
Further complicating the matter is the fact that these doctrines are fre-
quently applied arbitrarily.27  Judicial familiarity with the particular type of 
restraint is important in deciding which doctrine to apply,28 but typically 
courts will inquire into the restraint only as much as necessary to decide the 
case at bar.  The applied doctrine in any given case is often merely a post hoc 
label and does not necessarily reflect the nature of the inquiry undertaken.29 
C.  The Basics of a Sherman Act Section 1 Claim 
Antitrust claims against the NCAA have typically failed at the motion to 
dismiss stage.30  Although reasonableness is essential as to the question of 
whether a claim is ultimately successful on the merits, there are certain ele-
ments a plaintiff must show to state a viable Sherman Act Section 1 claim.31 
The first element that needs to be shown is an agreement between inde-
pendent economic entities in the form of a contract, combination, or conspir-
acy.32  Although an agreement can be expressed (i.e. orally or in writing), it is 
often inferred by conscious parallel conduct.33  If separate economic entities 
have consciously engaged in similar conduct and if the challenged conduct 
would not make business sense absent an unexpressed agreement, then a 
court will likely determine that an agreement exists.34  Thus, evidence of an 
agreement is often circumstantial.35 
The second element requires a showing that the agreement has resulted 
in an unreasonable restraint of trade in a relevant market.36  As a threshold 
matter, the alleged behavior must restrain a commercial market.37  This is 
because antitrust exists solely for the protection of commerce.  Therefore, if 
the alleged behavior affects some noncommercial activity then the law will be 
 
 26. See Bork, supra note 14, at 820-28. 
 27. Cal. Dental Ass’n v. FTC, 526 U.S. 756, 779-81 (1999). 
 28. See United States v. Realty Multi-List, Inc., 629 F.2d 1351, 1365 (5th Cir. 
1980). 
 29. Cal. Dental Ass’n, 526 U.S. at 781. 
 30. See Christian Dennie, White Out Full Grant-in-Aid: An Antitrust Action the 
NCAA Cannot Afford to Lose, 7 VA. SPORTS & ENT. L.J. 97, 109-11 (2007). 
 31. Agnew v. NCAA, 683 F.3d 328, 334-35 (7th Cir. 2012). 
 32. Id. at 335. 
 33. Interstate Circuit v. United States, 306 U.S. 208, 225-27 (1939); see also 
Agnew, 683 F.3d at 335. 
 34. Theatre Enters., Inc. v. Paramount Film Distrib. Corp., 346 U.S. 537, 540 
(1954). 
 35. Id. 
 36. See Agnew, 683 F.3d at 335. 
 37. See id. at 337. 
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inapplicable.38  As previously mentioned, once a commercial market has been 
identified, any naked restraint is typically found to be per se unreasonable 
and illegal.39  A restraint that arguably serves a procompetitive purpose, how-
ever, will be analyzed in depth to determine whether the restraint actually 
protects and promotes competition in the relevant commercial market at is-
sue.40 
The last element a plaintiff must prove is that the agreement has resulted 
in an antitrust injury implicating interstate commerce.41  An antitrust injury is 
an injury caused by the type of behavior that the antitrust laws seek to avert: 
anticompetitive commercial practices.42  The alleged injury cannot be the 
result of increased market competition, such as the loss of profits caused by 
the entry of a new firm into the relevant market.43  However, engaging in 
behavior such as horizontal price-fixing44 is a textbook example of the type of 
behavior that may cause an antitrust injury.45  Furthermore, courts routinely 
find that an antitrust injury has affected interstate commerce.46  This is espe-
cially true when the alleged injury has occurred in a substantial economic 
market.47  Yet, the substantiality of the market, for interstate commerce pur-
poses, is often a non-issue in Section 1 cases.48 
Finally, in order to bring a cause of action for an alleged violation of the 
antitrust laws, a claimant must have antitrust standing.49  Because anticom-
petitive behaviors often cause injuries that ripple throughout the economy, the 
standing requirement serves to limit the number of people who can sue.50  
Factors that bear on whether a claimant has antitrust standing include the 
existence of a more direct victim and the potential difficulty in allocating 
damages.51  There are, however, a number of other factors that weigh on 
whether a claimant will have standing to bring an action under Section 1 of 
the Sherman Act.52 
Antitrust law presents many hurdles that must be thoughtfully navigated 
before challenging the NCAA under the Sherman Act.  In the past, the NCAA 
 
 38. See id. 
 39. See supra Part II.B. 
 40. See Agnew, 683 F.3d at 336. 
 41. Apex Hosiery Co. v. Leader, 310 U.S. 469, 484-85 (1940). 
 42. Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-o-Mat, Inc., 429 U.S. 477, 489 (1977). 
 43. Id. at 488. 
 44. Agnew, 683 F.3d at 336. 
 45. See id. 
 46. McClain v. Real Estate Bd. of New Orleans, Inc., 444 U.S. 232, 242 (1980). 
 47. Id. 
 48. Times-Picayune Pub. Co. v. United States, 345 U.S. 594, 611 (1953). 
 49. Associated Gen. Contractors of Cal., Inc. v. Cal. State Council of Carpenters, 
459 U.S. 519, 535 (1983). 
 50. Id. at 534-35 (quoting Blue Shield of Va., Inc. v. McCready, 457 U.S. 465, 
476-77 (1982)). 
 51. Id. at 537-38. 
 52. Id. 
5
Starr: The Path to Antitrust Success
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 2014
1162 MISSOURI LAW REVIEW [Vol. 79 
has stood up to most every antitrust challenge it has faced.53  The history of 
antitrust suits against the NCAA, however, is instructive as to how antitrust 
law will be applied to NCAA rules and regulations in the future. 
D.  The Application of Section 1 to the NCAA 
The NCAA, a not-for-profit organization, is the most powerful force in 
collegiate sports in the United States.54  The NCAA governs the way in which 
hundreds of collegiate athletic programs are operated by setting the rules of 
the games and determining the eligibility of the athletes.55  The NCAA also 
exercises some control over what athletes do when not competing.56  Not 
surprisingly, since the NCAA influences the way in which hundreds of col-
leges57 and collegiate athletic programs are operated, the organization has 
been challenged under the federal antitrust laws on numerous occasions.58 
In NCAA v. Board of Regents of University of Oklahoma, the Supreme 
Court of the United States essentially insulated the NCAA from traditional 
per se analysis.59  In that case, the NCAA had restrained trade by blatantly 
fixing the price of football television contracts while constricting the number 
of football games that could be televised during any given week.60  The Court 
refused to apply the per se doctrine to the NCAA: 
[The] decision [was] not based on a lack of judicial experience with 
[the] type of arrangement, on the fact that the NCAA is organized as a 
nonprofit entity, or [out of] respect for the NCAA’s historic role in the 
preservation and encouragement of intercollegiate amateur athletics.  
Rather, what [was] critical is that [the] case involve[d] an industry in 
which horizontal restraints on competition are essential if the product 
is to be available at all.61 
The Court noted that, in order for national-level collegiate sports to exist 
in the first place, it was necessary for competing colleges to agree to certain 
common rules and regulations essential to the creation and sustained exist-
 
 53. See Neil Gibson, NCAA Scholarship Restrictions as Anticompetitive 
Measures: The One-Year Rule and Scholarship Caps as Avenues for Antitrust Scruti-
ny, 3 WM. & MARY BUS. L. REV. 203, 229 (2012). 
 54. See Daniel E. Lazaroff, The NCAA in Its Second Century: Defender of Ama-
teurism or Antitrust Recidivist?, 86 OR. L. REV. 329, 330-36 (2007). 
 55. Id. at 334-36. 
 56. Id. 
 57. NCAA colleges are known as “member institutions” by the NCAA.  They 
will be addressed as such for the remainder of this Summary. 
 58. See Lazaroff, supra note 54, at 329-30. 
 59. NCAA v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85, 100-01, 117-20 
(1984). 
 60. Id. at 94-95. 
 61. Id. at 100-01 (emphasis added). 
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ence of national collegiate sports.62  To that end, the NCAA served as the 
conduit by which member institutions could agree to those common rules.  
And although the common rules are technically in restraint of trade, they are 
necessary and justified because they lead to the creation of a national colle-
giate sports league.63  These agreed-upon NCAA rules – which are restraints 
on trade – are contained in the NCAA Division 1 Manual in the form of by-
laws.64 
For the most part, the NCAA bylaws can be scrutinized under the feder-
al antitrust laws.65  In fact, the Supreme Court acknowledged as much in 
Board of Regents.66  But the business of big-time college sports and the 
commercial nature of the member institutions that sponsor big-time college 
sports cannot be denied.67  The largest collegiate athletic programs are multi-
million dollar enterprises.68  They earn their money on the backs of the ath-
letes – the student-athletes.69  Student-athletes are collegiate amateurs that 
earn no money for their labor – their play on the field or court – but instead 
receive a portion of what it takes to attend their chosen college in the form of 
scholarships.70  These exchanges – “full scholarships in exchange for athletic 
services – are not noncommercial, since schools can make millions of dollars 
as a result of these transactions.”71  Thus, seemingly any bylaw that restrains 
these commercial transactions between student-athletes and member institu-
tions can be subjected to an inquiry under the law of antitrust.72 
III.  RECENT DEVELOPMENTS 
In the past few years, the NCAA and its bylaws have endured under ev-
er-increasing scrutiny.73  Recently, there have been a number of successful 
preliminary challenges to the legality of certain bylaws under the antitrust 
laws – a number of those challenges lodged by current or former student-
 
 62. Id. at 101. 
 63. Id. at 102. 
 64. Lazaroff, supra note 54, at 334-36. 
 65. Id. at 329-30. 
 66. See Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. at 117. 
 67. See NCAA v. Agnew, 683 F.3d 328, 340 (7th Cir. 2012). 
 68. See id. 
 69. See Robert A. McCormick & Amy Christian McCormick, A Trail of Tears: 
The Exploitation of the College Athlete, 11 FLA. COASTAL L. REV. 639, 640 (2010). 
 70. See Agnew, 683 F.3d at 340-41. 
 71. Id. at 340. 
 72. See id. 
 73. See generally Justin M. Hannan, Comment, Antitrust Law – Seventh Circuit 
Sees Through Façade, Exposes NCAA Scholarship Limits to Sherman Antitrust Scru-
tiny – Agnew v. NCAA, 683 F.3d 328 (7th Cir. 2012), 18 SUFFOLK J. TRIAL & APP. 
ADVOC. 345 (2013). 
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athletes.74  Surprisingly, one of those cases endured long enough to see a de-
termination on the merits in federal district court,75 though the ultimate deci-
sion has yet to be determined due to a pending NCAA appeal, as of this writ-
ing.76  The NCAA has responded to these looming threats by changing or 
altering certain existing bylaws.77  Some of the pending suits, though, con-
cern issues that cannot be addressed by a simple rule change.78  Those suits 
threaten to affect the core of the NCAA’s existence: the amateur collegiate 
model.79  Although the threat of sweeping change may loom in the back-
ground, the most immediate path to antitrust success against the NCAA will 
not require the NCAA to undertake a drastic revolution.80  Of the pending 
antitrust suits against the NCAA, only one subset of cases has the potential to 
effect real change to the way the NCAA operates: suits challenging the 
NCAA’s scholarship bylaws.81 
A.  The Student-Athlete Labor Market 
In Agnew v. NCAA, two current student-athletes challenged the validity 
of NCAA bylaws regulating the number and length of scholarships that could 
be awarded by member institutions.82  Specifically, the student-athletes 
claimed that bylaws “cap[ping] . . . the number of scholarships given per 
team and . . . prohibit[ing the granting] of multi-year scholarships” were ille-
gal restraints on trade in violation of the Sherman Act.83  However, even after 
amending their complaint two times, the student-athletes failed to identify a 
relevant commercial market upon which the bylaws acted.84  The district 
 
 74. See, e.g., In re NCAA Student-Athlete Name & Likeness Licensing Litig., 
990 F. Supp. 2d 996 (N.D. Cal. 2013). 
 75. O’Bannon v. NCAA, 7 F. Supp. 3d 955, 962 (N.D. Cal. 2014); see also 
Judge Rules Against NCAA, ESPN (Aug. 9, 2014, 5:12 PM), http://espn.go.com/
college-sports/story/_/id/11328442/judge-rules-ncaa-ed-obannon-antitrust-case. 
 76. See Associated Press, NCAA Files Appeal of O’Bannon Ruling, ESPN (Aug. 
21, 2014, 2:14 PM), http://espn.go.com/college-football/story/_/id/11387865/ncaa-
files-intent-appeal-obannon-decision. 
 77. See Jon Solomon, NCAA Correctly – and Barely – Passes Multiyear Schol-
arship Rule Whose Time Has Come, AL.COM (Feb. 18, 2011, 5:00 AM), 
http://www.al.com/sports/index.ssf/2012/02/ncaa_correctly_passes_multiyea.html. 
 78. See Stewart Mandel, USC’s Haden: Ed O’Bannon Case Could Cause Seis-
mic NCAA Change, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED (Apr. 1, 2013, 10:57 AM), http://sportsill-
ustrated.cnn.com/college-football/news/20130401/pat-haden-ed-obannon-ncaa/. 
 79. See Warren Zola, NCAA Amateurism Is an Illusion, US NEWS & WORLD 
REPORT (Apr. 1 2013), http://www.usnews.com/debate-club/should-ncaa-athletes-be-
paid/ncaa-amateurism-is-an-illusion. 
 80. See infra Part IV. 
 81. NCAA v. Agnew, 683 F.3d 328, 344 (7th Cir. 2012). 
 82. Id. at 332-33. 
 83. Id. at 332. 
 84. Id. at 347-48. 
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court dismissed the complaint and the student-athletes appealed.85  Seeming-
ly, the student-athletes were of the belief that a relevant commercial market 
need only be inferred and not expressly identified.86  The Seventh Circuit 
disagreed, stating that the identification of a relevant commercial market up-
on which the alleged illegal restraint acted was a threshold matter for Sher-
man Act applicability.87  Ultimately, the Seventh Circuit affirmed the dismis-
sal of the student-athletes’ complaint.88 
In Agnew, although the student-athletes failed to state a viable claim, the 
court was surprisingly instructive in describing what it would take to state a 
successful claim against the NCAA in the future.89  The Agnew court dis-
cussed the applicability of the Sherman Act to a cognizable student-athlete 
labor market at length.90  It ultimately stated, in dicta, that there was no doubt 
that member institutions were engaged in a “competitive market to attract 
student-athletes whose athletic labor [could] result in many benefits . . . in-
cluding economic gain.”91  Thus, the Agnew court recognized (1) that a labor 
market did exist between member institutions for student-athlete labor and (2) 
that the “proper identification of [that] labor market . . . would meet [a claim-
ant’s] burden of describing a cognizable market under the Sherman Act.”92 
Subsequently, in Rock v. NCAA, a former student-athlete sued the 
NCAA claiming almost exactly the same antitrust injury as what was at issue 
in Agnew.93  This time, however, the former student-athlete had “narrowed 
his proposed market to one sport in one division of the NCAA.”94  In other 
words, he had identified the national market for the labor of student-athletes 
in football at the NCAA Division I level as the relevant commercial market.95  
The NCAA filed a motion to dismiss the former student-athlete’s complaint.96  
However, the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Indiana accept-
ed the former student-athlete’s proffered market and it determined that the 
market was cognizable under the Sherman Act.97  In response, the NCAA 
first argued that the identified market was overly broad because it included 
two NCAA Division I subdivisions.98  The court rejected this argument, find-
ing that the “NCAA’s own structure classifying both FBS and FCS football 
 
 85. Id. at 333-34. 
 86. Id. at 333. 
 87. Id. at 345. 
 88. Id. at 347-48. 
 89. Id. at 346. 
 90. Id. at 338-45. 
 91. Id. at 347. 
 92. Id. at 346-47. 
 93. Rock v. NCAA, No. 1:12-cv-1019-JMS-DKL, 2013 WL 4479815, at *4 
(S.D. Ind. Aug. 16, 2013). 
 94. Id. at *11. 
 95. Id. at *9-10. 
 96. Id. at *4. 
 97. Id. at *11. 
 98. Id. at *10. 
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as part of the same division supports [the fact] that those subdivisions could 
be part of the same overarching market of Division I football.”99  The NCAA 
next argued that the identified market was “impermissibly small because it 
ignore[d] substitute opportunities outside of Division I football . . . .”100  The 
court again disagreed, finding that the opportunities outside of Division I 
football (i.e. NCAA Division II, Division III, and the NAIA) were “not ade-
quate substitutes for Division I football and, thus, not part of the same rele-
vant market.”101  Ultimately, the court in Rock, unlike the courts in Agnew, 
denied the NCAA’s motion to dismiss and upheld the former student-
athletes’ challenge to the NCAA’s scholarship-related bylaws.102 
B.  The Protection of the Amateur Student-Athlete 
In Rock, a former student-athlete used the Seventh Circuit’s reasoning in 
Agnew to attack the legality of the NCAA’s scholarship bylaws.103  In Agnew, 
the Seventh Circuit also addressed the susceptibility of NCAA bylaws in gen-
eral.104  The Agnew court, in dicta, reasoned that while some bylaws were 
presumptively procompetitive because they were necessary for the product of 
national-level collegiate sports to exist, certain other bylaws did not seem 
necessary for the end-product and, thus, were likely open to traditional anti-
trust analysis.105  The Agnew court relied heavily on the Supreme Court’s 
decision in Board of Regents in describing which bylaws were to be granted a 
favorable presumption and which bylaws were not to be granted such a pre-
sumption: 
[W]hen an NCAA bylaw is clearly meant to help maintain the revered 
tradition of amateurism in college sports or the preservation of the 
student-athlete in higher education, the bylaw will be presumed pro-
competitive, since we must give the NCAA ample latitude to play that 
role.  But if a regulation is not, on its face, helping to preserve a tradi-
tion that might otherwise die, . . . a more searching . . . analysis will be 
necessary to convince us of its procompetitive or anticompetitive na-
ture[.]106 
Thus, the Agnew court left open the possibility for future antitrust chal-
lenges to certain NCAA bylaws.107  And seemingly, while certain bylaws 
(e.g. the NCAA’s eligibility bylaws) were necessary for big-time college 
 
 99. Id. 
 100. Id. at *11. 
 101. Id. at *13. 
 102. Id. at *16. 
 103. See id. at *14. 
 104. See NCAA v. Agnew, 683 F.3d 328, 338-45 (7th Cir. 2012). 
 105. Id. at 342-43. 
 106. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 107. See id. at 344. 
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sports to exist in the first place, those bylaws dealing with other aspects of the 
NCAA student-athlete experience (i.e. the NCAA’s scholarship and financial 
aid bylaws) were not presumed lawful and could be analyzed for anticompeti-
tive effect under the federal antitrust laws.108 
The susceptibility of certain NCAA bylaws to antitrust scrutiny is not a 
new concept; courts have previously recognized this vulnerability.  However, 
until now, no parties have successfully advanced to have their cases heard on 
the merits.109  In In re NCAA 1-A Walk-on Football Players Litigation, for 
example, a federal district court found that certain bylaws do not “clearly 
implicate student-athlete eligibility in the same manner as” other bylaws de-
signed to advance amateurism.110  In that case, although the class of student-
athlete plaintiffs survived a motion for judgment on the pleadings, it did not 
achieve class certification.111 
Recently, there has been a veritable tidal wave of successful lawsuits 
challenging the NCAA bylaws.112  Many of these suits have relied heavily on 
the Seventh Circuit’s decision in Agnew.113 
In Rock, a single student-athlete plaintiff prevailed against the NCAA at 
the motion to dismiss stage while challenging the NCAA’s scholarship by-
laws.114  As of this writing, the case was proceeding to a decision on the mer-
its.115  In In re NCAA Student-Athlete Name & Likeness Licensing Litigation, 
a class of current and former student-athletes prevailed against the NCAA at 
the motion to dismiss stage while challenging bylaws restricting student-
athletes’ right to publicity.116  In that case, restyled O’Bannon v. NCAA,117 the 
class of current and former student-athletes found success at trial as well.118  
There the district court found that the NCAA had violated antitrust laws by 
prohibiting student-athletes from generating income from their own publici-
 
 108. See id. at 343-44. 
 109. See Lazaroff, supra note 54, at 345-49. 
 110. In re NCAA I-A Walk-On Football Players Litig., 398 F. Supp. 2d 1144, 
1149 (W.D. Wash. 2005). 
 111. See In re NCAA I-A Walk-On Football Players Litig., No. C04-1254C, 2006 
WL 1207915, at *1 (W.D. Wash. May 3, 2006). 
 112. See Jerry Hinnen, Labor Attorney Jeffrey Kessler Files Antitrust Lawsuit v. 
NCAA, CBSSPORTS.COM (Mar. 17, 2014, 11:42 AM), http://www.cbssports.com/coll-
egefootball/eye-on-college-football/24488838/labor-attorney-jeffrey-kessler-files-
antitrust-lawsuit-vs-ncaa. 
 113. See Rock v. NCAA, No. 1:12-cv-1019-JMS-DKL, 2013 WL 4479815, *4 
(S.D. Ind. Aug. 16, 2013); In re NCAA Student-Athlete Name & Likeness Licensing 
Litig., 990 F. Supp. 2d 996, 1004 (N.D. Cal. 2013). 
 114. See Rock, 2013 WL 4479815, at *1. 
 115. See Randy Haight, Alleging an Anticompetitive Impact on a Discernible 
Market: Changing the Antitrust Landscape for Collegiate Athletics, 21 JEFFERY S. 
MOORAD SPORTS L.J. 19, 37 (2014) (discussing Rock and its implications in detail). 
 116. See In re NCAA Student-Athlete Name & Likeness Licensing Litig., 990 F. 
Supp. 2d  at 997-98. 
 117. O’Bannon v. NCAA, 7 F. Supp. 3d 955 (N.D. Cal. 2014). 
 118. See Judge Rules Against NCAA, supra note 75. 
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ty.119  The district court entered a permanent injunction against the NCAA, 
requiring the organization to share at least some of the proceeds derived from 
student-athlete publicity with the student-athletes.120  This case, however, is 
far from resolved, as the NCAA has appealed the decision.121  These “suc-
cessful” lawsuits, now either proceeding to a decision on the merits or pend-
ing appeal, will help determine the future applicability of the NCAA’s bylaws 
to student-athletes. 
IV.  DISCUSSION 
For the first time since the Supreme Court’s decision in Board of Re-
gents, the future of the NCAA is in the hands of the courts.  Unlike Board of 
Regents, though, the more recent antitrust challenges in Rock and in 
O’Bannon have been brought by or on behalf of student-athletes.122  The cas-
es threaten to change some of the core bylaws of the NCAA.123  In other 
words, these recent challenges will test the legality of the NCAA’s control 
over student-athletes and may change the way in which the NCAA governs 
the student-athlete experience going forward.  It is impossible to know how 
these cases will be decided for certain.  However, a couple of things are cer-
tain.  First, assuming the NCAA remains unchanged, there will at least be 
additional challenges to its scholarship bylaws.124  Second, assuming the 
NCAA loses any or all of the more recent antitrust challenges brought by 
student-athletes, it will have to change.125 
A.  The Potential for Additional Challenges to the NCAA’s Operating 
Bylaws 
The NCAA’s Division I is the home of big-time collegiate sports.126  
The NCAA governs Division I member institutions by way of the NCAA 
Division I Manual.127  This Manual is comprised of hundreds of bylaws con-
 
 119. See id. 
 120. See id. 
 121. Id. 
 122. See Doug Lederman, College Sports’ Antitrust Vulnerability, INSIDE HIGHER 
ED (Apr. 16, 2014), http://www.insidehighered.com/news/2014/04/16/sports-antitrust
-lawyers-latest-target-ncaa-scholarship-limits#sthash.AHo9NWGn.dpbs. 
 123. Id. 
 124. See id. 
 125. See id. 
 126. See Lindsay J. Rosenthal, Comment, From Regulating Organization to Mul-
ti-Million Dollar Business: The NCAA Is Commercializing the Amateur Competition 
It Has Taken Almost a Century to Create, 13 SETON HALL J. SPORT L. 321, 336 
(2003). 
 127. See Gibson, supra note 53, at 217-18; see also Robert John Givens, Com-
ment, “Capitamateuralism”: An Examination of the Economic Exploitation of Stu-
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tained in thirty-three articles.128  Articles 1 through 6 contain the NCAA’s 
constitution.129  Articles 10 through 22 contain “operating bylaws, which 
consist of legislation adopted . . . to promote the principles enunciated in the 
constitution and to achieve the [NCAA’s] purposes.”130  Articles 31 and 33 
contain administrative bylaws that govern the process by which the NCAA 
certifies member institutions and enforces its operating bylaws.131  The 
NCAA exercises most of its control over the member institutions and student-
athletes by way of its operating bylaws.132  While many of the bylaws are 
necessary for the existence of the NCAA’s amateur collegiate model, some of 
its operating bylaws do not implicate the existence of the amateur student-
athlete.133  Thus, there is the potential that certain NCAA bylaws may be sub-
jected to viable antitrust claims in the future. 
As mentioned above, there are two major federal antitrust lawsuits out-
standing against the NCAA.134  These lawsuits are focused on two types of 
bylaws.  The class of current and former student-athlete plaintiffs in 
O’Bannon is challenging bylaws that restrict student-athletes’ use of their 
own publicity rights while allowing member institutions to freely use student-
athletes’ publicity rights for their own purposes.135  These bylaws are mostly 
contained in Article 12 – which governs the amateur status of student-athletes 
– but can be seen throughout the NCAA Manual.136  The plaintiff in Rock is 
challenging financial aid bylaws restricting the duration of athletic scholar-
ships contained in Article 15, which were formerly limited to renewable one-
year periods.137  Both Article 12 and Article 15 contain a number of other 
bylaws that arguably serve no legitimate business purpose other than to re-
strain competition.138  Thus, there may be potential for future inquiries into 
the economic reasonability of their existence.  However, it is unlikely that the 
courts will invalidate any bylaw dealing with the amateur status of student-
athletes.  Therefore, it may be that the only bylaws truly susceptible to suc-
 
dent-Athletes by the National Collegiate Athletic Association, 82 UMKC L. REV.  
205, 208-09 (2013). 
 128. See NCAA Academic & Membership Affairs Staff, 2014-15, NCAA Divi-
sion I Manual (2014), available at https://www.ncaapublications.com/p-4355-2014-
2015-ncaa-division-i-manual-august-version.aspx. 
 129. Id. at viii, §§ 1-6. 
 130. Id. at viii, §§ 10-23. 
 131. Id. at viii, §§ 31-33. 
 132. See sources cited supra note 75. 
 133. See Agnew v. NCAA, 683 F.3d 328, 338-45 (7th Cir. 2012). 
 134. See supra Part IV. 
 135. O’Bannon v. NCAA, 7 F. Supp. 3d 955, 962-63 (N.D. Cal. 2014); In re 
NCAA Student-Athlete Name & Likeness Licensing Litig., 990 F. Supp. 2d 996, 998 
(N.D. Cal. 2013). 
 136. See generally NCAA Division I Manual, supra note 128, at § 12. 
 137. See id. at § 15. 
 138. See id. at §§ 12, 15. 
13
Starr: The Path to Antitrust Success
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 2014
1170 MISSOURI LAW REVIEW [Vol. 79 
cessful antitrust challenges are those dealing with scholarships and financial 
aid. 
1.  The Susceptibility of Amateurism-Related Bylaws to Antitrust   
Scrutiny 
Article 12 ensures that student-athletes do not use their athletic talents to 
earn money outside of their NCAA-sponsored scholarships.139  Along with 
controlling how a student-athlete uses his or her likeness, Article 12 also gov-
erns the way in which a student-athlete participates in off-season, non-NCAA 
amateur sports.140  If a valid antitrust claim can be stated based on the belief 
that student-athletes should be able to use their own likeness to obtain some 
sort of compensation, then it would seem to be likely that a valid claim could 
be stated based on the NCAA’s restraint of non-NCAA amateur sports.  In 
other words, it would seem as if the NCAA’s restrictions on participation in 
non-NCAA amateur sports serve no purpose but to dampen competition be-
tween the NCAA and other amateur sports organizations. 
However, unlike the NCAA’s restraint of publicity rights, the NCAA’s 
restrictions on participation in non-NCAA amateur sports do not necessarily 
involve a restraint on the market for student-athlete labor.141  They implicate 
restrictions on non-NCAA sports organizations and arguably lack the requi-
site commercial-market component for Sherman Act applicability.142  The 
NCAA bylaws restricting participation in non-NCAA sports do not restrain 
the million-dollar competition between member institutions for the labor of 
student-athletes.143  Other amateur sports organizations do not compete for 
athletes on the same level as the NCAA and are not economically comparable 
to the NCAA.144  Also, non-NCAA amateur sports, such as the Amateur Ath-
letics Union145 and various other sports clubs, are not likely to comprise a 
“relevant market” due to the fact that these organizations can be broadly de-
fined and are highly substitutable.146 
It would seem that unless a valid commercial activity could be implicat-
ed and a relevant market sufficiently delineated, a valid Section 1 claim 
would likely be non-cognizable against the majority of bylaws contained in 
Article 12.  Thus, outside of the NCAA’s restrictions on publicity rights, Ar-
 
 139. See id. at § 12.1.2. 
 140. See, e.g., id. at § 12.1.2.1.4.3. 
 141. Cf. Agnew v. NCAA, 683 F.3d 328, 342-44 (7th Cir. 2012). 
 142. Cf. id. at 338. 
 143. See Rock v. NCAA, No. 1:12-cv-1019-JMS-DKL, 2013 WL 4479815, at *13 
(S.D. Ind. Aug. 16, 2013). 
 144. See id. 
 145. See generally The Government of Amateur Athletics: The NCAA-AAU Dis-
pute, 41 S. CAL. L. REV. 464, 464 (1968). 
 146. See Rock, 2013 WL 4479815, at *11. 
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ticle 12 may not provide ample opportunity for additional antitrust challeng-
es. 
Additionally, Article 16 contains various bylaws that would seem to di-
rectly affect the student-athlete labor market.147  Article 16 controls awards, 
benefits, and expenses that student-athletes can receive while enrolled at 
member institutions.148  However, unlike Article 15, which deals with schol-
arships and the like, Article 16 pertains to extra benefits awarded to student-
athletes because of their athletic ability.149  In that sense, Article 16 is similar 
to Article 12: they both govern NCAA amateurism.150  The NCAA’s prohibi-
tion on pay-for-play – outside of the permissible scholarship limits sanctioned 
by the association – is ostensibly required for the existence of the amateur 
student-athlete.151  Therefore, it is highly unlikely that the bylaws in Article 
16 are susceptible to antitrust scrutiny based on the Supreme Court’s reason-
ing in Board of Regents.152 
2.  The Susceptibility of Scholarship-Related Bylaws to Antitrust   
Scrutiny 
On the other hand, Article 15 does provide an opportunity for antitrust 
applicability.  Article 15 limits the manner by which student-athletes are al-
lowed to finance their college education.153  Student-athletes can only receive 
financial aid per NCAA legislation.154  The maximum allowable scholarship 
that can be awarded to any individual is limited to the cost of attendance – i.e. 
the total cost to attend an institution including tuition, fees, books, travel, 
food, and other related expenses.155  The NCAA limits the number of scholar-
ships that can be awarded per team.156  The limits are calculated by determin-
ing grant-in-aid, which includes only tuition, fees, room, and books.157  The 
team-specific limitation of the number of scholarships that can be awarded is 
called the countable aid limitation.158  The countable aid limits in Article 15 
 
 147. See NCAA Division I Manual, supra note 128, at § 16. 
 148. See id. at § 16.02.3. 
 149. See id. at § 16.01.1. 
 150. Compare id. at § 16 with id. at § 12. 
 151. See Christian Dennie, Amateurism Stifles a Student-Athlete’s Dream, 12 
SPORTS L. J. 221, 225-26 (2005). 
 152. See NCAA v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85, 117 (1984). 
 153. See NCAA Division I Manual, supra note 128, at § 15. 
 154. See Christopher Davis, Jr. & Dylan Oliver Malagrino, The Myth of the “Full 
Ride”: Cheating Our Collegiate Athletes and the Need for Additional NCAA Scholar-
ship-Limit Reform, 65 OKLA. L. REV. 605, 610 (2013). 
 155. Id. at 608. 
 156. Id. 
 157. Id. 
 158. See, e.g., BYU Athletic Communication, Financial Aid, BYU COUGARS 
(May 18, 2011, 2:12 PM), http://byucougars.com/compliance/student-athletes/financ-
ial-aid. 
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work against the awarding of full cost of attendance scholarships – member 
institutions are incentivized to limit scholarships to grant-in-aid in order to 
maximize the efficient allocation of those scholarships.159 
Based on the reasoning in Agnew and Rock, it appears that scholarship 
bylaws are susceptible to antitrust scrutiny.160  The student-athlete plaintiff in 
Rock challenged only the prohibition of multi-year scholarships and the limit 
on the number of scholarships contained in Article 15, but the Rock court’s 
reasoning seemingly applies throughout Article 15 due to the fact that all of 
the Article 15 bylaws limit a student-athlete’s ability to receive NCAA schol-
arships.161  But for the scholarship limitations, member institutions could 
award more scholarships (i.e. higher number and higher amount) to more 
student-athletes.162 
Further, while these scholarship limitations may provide equity between 
member institutions, they do not necessarily implicate amateurism or the ex-
istence of the student-athlete because, as noted in Rock and Agnew, those 
products could continue to exist.163  In fact, removing limits on financial aid 
would seem to promote those concepts.  Amateurism, as defined by the 
NCAA, allows for the award of scholarships to play for NCAA member insti-
tutions.164  Without scholarship restrictions, member institutions could con-
tinue to award scholarships to student-athletes and student-athletes could 
continue to play and go to school.165  Seemingly, member institutions would 
be free to award better scholarships in a more competitive student-athlete 
labor market – thereby resulting in a better product.166  However, since Arti-
cle 15 currently lessens the competition for student-athletes between member 
institutions by way of restricting the awarding of scholarships, it would seem 
to have a clear anticompetitive effect resulting in an antitrust injury.167  Fur-
ther, the relevant market has already been identified in Rock – i.e. the specific 
NCAA sport in the specific NCAA division.168  Thus, with the relevant mar-
ket defined and alleged anticompetitive effect identified, the potential for 
antitrust challenges to the Article 15 bylaws is highly plausible. 
 
 159. See Kemper C. Powell, A Façade of Amateurism: An Examination of the 
NCAA Grant-in-Aid System Under the Sherman Act, 20 SPORTS L.J. 241, 259-60 
(2013). 
 160. See Agnew v. NCAA, 683 F.3d 328, 343-44 (7th Cir. 2012). 
 161. See Rock v. NCAA, No. 1:12-cv-1019-JMS-DKL, 2013 WL 4479815, at 
*14-16.  (S.D. Ind. Aug. 16, 2013). 
 162. Davis, Jr., supra note 154, at 618-19. 
 163. See id. 
 164. See Gibson, supra note 53, at 218-21, 232-34. 
 165. See Brian Bennett, NCAA Board Votes to Allow Autonomy, ESPN (Aug. 8, 
2014, 1:22 PM), http://espn.go.com/college-sports/story/_/id/11321551/ncaa-board-
votes-allow-autonomy-five-power-conferences. 
 166. See Dennie, supra note 30, at 125. 
 167. See Davis, Jr., supra note 154, at 633-36. 
 168. Rock v. NCAA, No. 1:12-cv-1019-JMS-DKL, 2013 WL 4479815 at *10 
(S.D. Ind. Aug. 16, 2013). 
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Challenging the NCAA’s bylaws under the federal antitrust law can be 
done.  However, the types of bylaws that can be analyzed are very limited.  
Article 12 and Article 16 both seem to implicate the existence of NCAA ama-
teurism, and both articles are likely practically impervious to antitrust at-
tack.169  On the other hand, Article 15 does not seem to necessarily directly 
implicate amateurism or the NCAA’s collegiate model.  Thus, Article 15 and 
the NCAA’s scholarship bylaws may, at the very least, be capable of being 
analyzed under the rule of reason.  The future disposition of Rock – and other 
pending cases – will determine whether or not Article 15 stands up to anti-
trust scrutiny.  However, it would seem as if it is only a matter of time before 
the NCAA’s scholarship bylaws will be radically changed. 
B.  A Potential Change to the NCAA’s Financial Aid Bylaws 
It is apparent that, regardless of whether the NCAA survives its most re-
cent challenges, something will have to change.  There are a number of ways 
in which the NCAA can mold its scholarship-related bylaws to fit its ama-
teurism model without micromanaging the member institutions or the stu-
dent-athletes.  This section focuses specifically on the scholarship bylaws in 
Article 15 because, as previously mentioned, many of the recent challenges to 
the NCAA’s structure have focused on scholarships.170  Further, promoting 
the equitable distribution of scholarships through deregulation would most 
likely quell complaints of unfairness from both student-athletes and the pub-
lic.171  For instance, allowing for more scholarship-related competition in the 
market for student-athlete labor would lead to better scholarships and, thus, 
student-athletes would likely feel less exploited by the member institutions 
and the NCAA.172  This section will discuss at least one potential change to 
the NCAA’s scholarship bylaws: the restructuring of the NCAA’s grant-in-
aid system.  This proposed change would benefit student-athletes while stay-
ing true to the NCAA’s amateur collegiate model. 
There are a number of possible changes that the NCAA could undertake 
when overhauling its scholarship bylaws.  However, countable aid limitations 
– restrictions on the size and number of scholarships that can be awarded per 
team – can be easily changed to better provide for student-athletes.173  Specif-
ically, the NCAA could abolish the current countable full grant-in-aid schol-
arship174 and replace it with a countable full cost of attendance scholarship.175  
This change would benefit student-athletes in two ways. 
 
 169. See supra Part IV.A.1. 
 170. See supra Part IV.A. 
 171. See In re NCAA Student Athlete Name & Likeness Licensing Litig., 990 F. 
Supp. 2d 996, 1004 (N.D. Cal. 2013); Rock, 2013 WL 4479815, at *4. 
 172. See Davis, Jr., supra note 154, at 642-43. 
 173. See Powell, supra note 159, at 259. 
 174. See Dennie, supra note 30, at 102 n.33. 
 175. See Goodwin, supra note 6, at 1313-15. 
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First, it would allow for more vigorous competition between member in-
stitutions for the labor of student-athletes and member institutions would be 
incentivized to offer more lucrative scholarships to the student-athletes.176  
Second, providing for cost of attendance would allow student-athletes to live 
comfortably during their time in college.177  This sounds paternal but it 
should be recognized that many if not all student-athletes spend the majority 
of their time in the gym or on the field and the rest of their time in the class-
room.178  They have very limited opportunity to support themselves outside 
of those demands.  Accordingly, providing for ordinary living expenses – 
through a cost of attendance scholarship – could help replace the opportuni-
ties forgone by student-athletes due to their demanding sport-dominated 
schedules. 
Providing cost of attendance, especially in regard to those student-
athletes who come from economically disadvantaged backgrounds, would 
also reduce the stress of obtaining necessities while increasing the amount of 
time student-athletes could spend at school.179  This benefit for student-
athletes would benefit the NCAA as well.  It would arguably create a better 
collegiate product.  This is because more time spent in the classroom will 
increase academic results and more time spent in the gym or on the field 
would increase the quality of play as well.180  Also, it would lessen the num-
ber of NCAA bylaw violations because it would essentially deregulate a large 
portion of the current NCAA manual and the NCAA would exercise consid-
erably less control over member institutions. 
Changing the countable aid limitations from grant-in-aid to cost of at-
tendance would also allow the NCAA to stay true to its amateur-collegiate 
model.  For starters, awarding cost of attendance scholarships is already al-
lowable per the NCAA’s scholarship bylaws.181  However, member institu-
tions are incentivized to award grant-in-aid scholarships due to the countable 
aid limitations.182  If these limits were abolished, the NCAA scholarship and 
amateurism bylaws would not have to undergo any drastic changes; the 
NCAA would not have to set new limits for the maximum number of scholar-
ships that can awarded.  Also, changing the countable aid limitations would 
preserve the NCAA’s scholarship-for-play collegiate model. 
The NCAA has recently taken steps to give more autonomy to its more 
powerful Division I member institutions.183  This autonomy measure was 
ultimately adopted184 and gave these schools – which constitute approximate-
 
 176. See Dennie, supra note 30, at 123-24. 
 177. See Davis, Jr., supra note 154, at 620-21. 
 178. Id. at 621. 
 179. Id. at 620-21. 
 180. Id. at 622. 
 181. Id. at 608. 
 182. See Goodwin, supra note 6, at 1277-80. 
 183. See Bennett, supra note 165. 
 184. The autonomy legislation entered an “override” period on August 8, 2014, 
during which other schools had the opportunity to block its adoption.  See id.  It was 
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ly twenty percent of the NCAA’s Division I membership – the choice to relax 
the NCAA’s scholarship restrictions.185  Although providing autonomy to the 
more powerful member institutions may ultimately benefit the less powerful 
ones as well,186 it is unclear why the NCAA has chosen to create a disparity.  
Deregulating Article 15, as applied to all member institutions, would be mu-
tually beneficial for both the NCAA and the student-athletes.  Although ineq-
uity in the type and size of scholarships that member institutions could offer 
would persist, those inequities would likely work themselves out eventually.  
Regardless, there is already vast inequality between member institutions.  If 
deregulated, the scholarship bylaws would simply incentivize member institu-
tions to allocate their resources more efficiently while providing them with a 
powerful recruiting tool.  Student-athletes would benefit from the increase in 
the depth and breadth of scholarships.  And, finally, the NCAA would create 
a better product, which in turn would make it more money. 
V.  CONCLUSION 
Antitrust is a tool that can be used to effect commercial change.  Cur-
rently, student-athletes are using the antitrust laws to effect a change in the 
NCAA’s bylaws.  While these changes will not necessarily go to the core of 
the NCAA’s operations, they will likely benefit student-athletes financially.  
Specifically, using antitrust to effect change to the NCAA’s scholarship by-
laws will have a positive effect on the market for the labor of student-athletes.  
Member institutions will be able to award more creative scholarships and 
student-athletes will receive better scholarships.  This will work out for the 
NCAA as well; the NCAA will have fewer bylaws to regulate and the associ-
ation as a whole will produce a better product.  However, any changes to the 
NCAA’s bylaws will be on hold pending disposition of the current NCAA-
related antitrust cases in federal court.  Although the path to antitrust success 
against the NCAA may be limited, one thing is certain: the current direction 
of the NCAA is unpopular.  Regardless of whether the ultimate disposition of 
the pending suits is for or against the NCAA, it is apparent that the NCAA 
will have to continue to change and evolve to better serve whom they purport 
to serve: the student-athletes. 
 
not overridden by the membership at-large.  NCAA Autonomy Structure Moves For-
ward After Avoiding Override, USA TODAY (Oct. 6, 2014, 7:34 PM), http://www. 
usatoday.com/story/sports/college/2014/10/06/ncaa-autonomy-structure-moves-
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 185. See Bennett, supra note 165.  Recently, the most powerful NCAA schools 
enacted the “first package of autonomous legislation, headlined by a full cost-of-
attendance measure” intended to align full grant-in-aid scholarships with cost of at-
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